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Madrasas in Pakistan - Breeding ground for terrorism?[1]

I. Introduction

The terrorist attacks on India´s commercial capital Mumbai have once again made Pakistan´s radical Islamist organisations the focus of global security discourses. These are supplied with young *jihadis* who were educated at some of the radical *madrasas* still flourishing in Pakistan. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and the London bombings in July 2005 the connections of radical organisations with *madrasas* in Pakistan became known. Thus, the link between *madrasa* education and Islamist violence has been in the spotlight for several years now. According to Western discourses, Pakistani *madrasas* serve as factories for global *jihad* and prepare the ground for international terrorism.

It is increasingly being argued that *madrasa* pedagogy fosters anti-western, traditionalist, and even fundamentalist worldviews and thereby produces fanaticism and intolerance. This is why *madrasas* are today perceived as a threat to international peace and security. This populist linkage to international terrorism has rapidly become a mainstream notion. Besides this newly hostile public appraisal of *madrasas*, September 11, 2001, has also fostered efforts of governments around the globe to gain control over private, traditional or non-modern sectors of society.

Since 2001, various state policies have restricted civil rights in South Asia, the West and other regions. In this context, the perceived rise of international terrorism as a result of the 9/11-attacks has been turned into an excuse for pushing restrictive controls on societal spheres previously free of state influence. However, in Pakistan although it can be argued that the present intension of the Pakistani state in subjecting *madrasas* to scrutiny may be new, its suspicion of these institutions has a much longer tradition[2].

Although literature on the role of *madrasas* in South Asia, especially in Pakistan, has expanded in recent years, most of that literature has been written from security perspectives. Following the standard explanation it is religious education which provides the basis for religious extremism. Pakistani *madrasas* for their part are inherently connected to religious education, so it has become a popular method to count the number of *madrasas* (or *madrasa* students) in order to "measure" the (Islamist) extremist threat. Only a few in-depth studies go on to note that, owing to the problem of sectarianism, the extremist threat does not only harm the West, but also the states in which the *madrasas* are located, in our case Pakistan itself. The simplistic accusation of *madrasas* and their teaching has led to misconceptions that still influence the academic and political debate, whereby, inadequate and overly general conclusions have been drawn on the issue. Unfortunately, most of the works on religious education lack well-grounded research, and therefore, pile assertion upon assertion in an effort to frame and support their exceedingly thin arguments[3].

When analysing the role of *madrasas* in Pakistan it is important to note that the *raison d´être* for *madrasas* in Pakistan is first and foremost the unavailability of state schools and the peoples´ belief that *madrasas* will form a better personality of the students in the traditions of tribal societies. They can be described as traditional institutions providing education to the poor in the context of Islamic social welfare. Historically, it is debatable when *madrasas* were introduced to the Indian sub-continent but the earliest known institutions were not recorded until the 13th century under the Turks. By the 14th century, their number had dramatically increased. Hence, one can assert that *madrasas* look back on a long history in Islamic societies of the Indian sub-continent.

While it is obvious that religious education within the framework of Pakistani *madrasas* has contributed to a fundamentalist and intolerant interpretation of Islam and thus increased the readiness to use violence in the name of religion, this article uses another starting point for analysis. In contrast to many recent contributions on the issue, this article

[1] This article is an abstract of Jamal Malik´s new book "Madrasas in South Asia. Teaching terror?", Routledge 2008, ISBN: 978-0-415-44247-3.

[2] This becomes obvious when one regards the continuous government efforts of streamlining madrasas into the national education system.

[3] Some well researched works on religious education in *madrasas* exist that avoid these overhasty conclusions, among them Metcalf 1982, Grandin and Gaborieau 1997, Robinson 2001, Zaman 2002, Hartung and Reifeld 2006.

does not simply draw on the widely assumed causality of the pure existence of *madrasas* for the rise of Islamist terrorism. Instead, the analysis shows that homogenisation pressures emanating from global as well as local processes account for the increase of religious resistance. Therefore, one may distinguish two equally viable but largely competing approaches: the "objective" approach of the political economy of globalisation that assumes *madrasas* to be largely dependent on national/global pressures "from above", and the "inter-subjective" approach that highlights the role of ideas and local identity "from below". Both approaches are – as it will be shown – closely entangled.

The former approach of political economy of globalisation states that homogenising processes are carried out through processes like globalisation and secularisation. These streamlining, or homogenisation processes go back to the postulates of a "global modernisation" that seeks to strengthen secular, universalistic patterns of knowledge.

Such a paternalistic and biased assumption is at the same time exploited by a calculated expansion of the state-domain to previously untouched areas of society. State policies, serving to extend the process of globalisation and homogenisation and seeking to impose trans-cultural values, look for recognition and acceptance of this process as a "de-cultured" one. This state-led globalisation encounters various reactions and meets resistance or even counter-globalisation movements. Hence, the recent expressions of religious "resistance" in the context of local *madrasas* – as a space of autochthonous cultural articulation, as it were – can be seen as a response to the political economy of globalisation and state penetration proceeding "from above".

At the same time, *madrasas* have developed their own dynamics *vis-à-vis* the ever-encroaching state responding to local struggles between local factions competing for scare resources "from below". Their engagement in homogenisation and contestation in the pursuit of influence over their and others' constituencies is a case in point. In this argument, the struggle is not for economic and political influence but reflects divergent approaches within the specific terms of Islam itself. This situation specifically accounts for Pakistan where monolithic expressions of religious identity are pitted against diverse expressions of religious or sectarian alternatives. Hence, *madrasas* are focused on and affected by global as well as local factors, resulting in a variety of forms of religious resistance. In fact, there is interplay between these two levels of analysis, when *madrasas* are situated in positions that merge both levels.

The article moves on by analysing *madrasas* in Pakistan from historical and contemporary perspectives, taking state and society into account. With the social and political impact of *madrasas* in mind, the two competing approaches to explain the increase of religious "resistance" are introduced in full length. Finally, some thoughts of how to overcome the bloody spiral of homogenisation and religious "resistance" are discussed.

II. Historical and contemporary context

Madrasas have a long history in Pakistan. In the non-colonial contexts of traditional societies of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the country was dotted with *madrasas*[4]. At that time two interrelating developments occurred: the evolution of *Dars-i Nizami*[5], and the emergence of territorial lords on the margins of the Mughal Empire, who were supported by wealthy merchants and bankers. This complex process resulted in what may be called the "regional centralisation" of Mughal power leading to the establishment of territorial princely states. Each of these along ethnical or sectarian lines grouped new identities and claimed their own religio-cultural "variety".

The *Dars-i Nizami,* a standardised set of knowledge named after its founder Mullah Nizam al-Din of Lucknow (d. 1748), strongly was used to implement the group-specific sets of knowledge, common norms and values. The *Dars* supported Muslim scholastic philosophy and law, both of which were based on logic and were widely congruent with state domination. Despite these efforts to transmit a set of knowledge as uniformly as possible, the *Dars-i Nizami* was and still is as little monolithic as is Islamic law or Islamic "orthodoxy". Local differences are noticeable such as those between Lucknow and Delhi, Allahabad

[4] See Leitner, G.W. 1997.

[5] For a prototype of generalisation see; Malik, Jamal 1997: Islamische Gelehrtenkultur in Nordindien: Entwicklungsgeschichte und Ten denzen am Beispiel von Lucknow.

and Khairabad, Bareilly and Deoband[6]. While the impact of a specific school is not necessarily restricted to one single region, local styles could change over time through contact with other influences. Therefore, *Dars-i Nizami* is characterised by homogenisation just as much as pluralism and divergence among different styles.

In the new political entities *madrasas* played an important role as central institutions for the provision of knowledge. Their teachings included rational *(ma`qulat)* as well as transmitted *(manqulat)* sciences, as distinguished by Ibn Khaldun[7]. The difference between the two branches of science is their ultimate source, i.e. divine vs. human inspired knowledge. Together with the concept of the Spanish mystic theorist, Ibn Arabi, (d. 1240), the so-called rational sciences, such as logic, philosophy, astronomy, medicine, mathematics, and metaphysics soon became a powerful aspect of Muslim education and knowledge.

This is particularly true in the context of empire building and processes of cultural integration.[8] During the Mughal era *ma`qulat* gained considerably importance. It is widely assumed that in the disintegration and decline of the Mughal Empire *manqulat* regained importance. Later, the colonial rule divided the space in religious (*dini)* and secular *(dunyawi)*, i.e. public and private branches. This had strong impact on *madrasas* since they were marginalised and confined to the private realm when they refused to subscribe to the new paradigm of "useful education" (i.e. natural sciences, mathematics, economics, philosophy, ethics, and history).

Eventually, they lost their central position as general training institutes and turned into institutions exclusively for religious education *(dini madrasa)*. This fermentation process led to the emergence of various Sunni schools of thought that added to the religious and social complexity of South Asia. Some movements made use of religious symbols in order to mobilise against colonial power. Law, mysticism, and prophetic tradition were the main orientations of the new religious consciousness. At independence in 1947, the distinction between public and private was welcomed by the representatives of the post-colonial states and the guardians of the *madrasas*.[9] Two conclusions can be drawn from the historical perspective. First, the distinction between rational as well as transmitted sciences had existed long before the advent of colonial rule. Second, *madrasas* witnessed several changes in the subject matters reflecting the political and social order of the day.

Today, huge *madrasa* networks exist in Pakistan, most of them belong to one or another Islamic umbrella organisation set up since the 1960s. Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine the total number of *madrasas,* since many are not officially registered. Therefore, a number of 10.000 to 40.000 *madrasas* working in Pakistan are only estimations. Police resources currently estimate about two million *madrasa* students in Pakistan, while a 2005 World Bank Report counts less than half a million students. A high percentage of the graduates of higher Islamic education institutions constitute a leadership elite in religious and political spheres, such as religio-political parties.

Most of the today's *madrasas* are financially independent from the state since they earn their income from the local or regional environment, for example from neighbouring tradesmen, notables, and farmers, but also politicians and foreign donors. With this income the *madrasas* offer free education as well as financial help and food to their mostly destitute students. Thus, *madrasas* enjoy a high degree of autonomy from the state while at the same time they dominate the private or religious branches of society.

During the dictatorship of army general Zia ul-Haq, the number of *madrasas* as well as efforts of the state to domesticate religious sectors dramatically increased. The state effectively channelled their activity towards militancy, thus the *Ulema* and religious movements became politicised and were used to support the superpower proxy-war in Afghanistan and the conflict over Kashmir. The Iranian revolution, the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan and later the rise of the *Taliban* convinced the *Ulema* that Islam could be a power of its own. Therefore, the *Ulema* were shifting from conservatism to revivalism and activism.[10] The *madrasa* curriculum is constituted through *Dars-i Nizami,* which is being taught for eight years after the students finalise elementary schools. Not all institutions

[6] For a good introduction see Metcalf 1982.
[7] The „science of the classifications of the sciences" divided – according to Ibn Khaldun (1332 – 1406) – the sciences into transmitted (naqliyya) and rational (aqliyya), sacred (diniyya) and profane (dunyawiyya).
[8] See contributions of F. Robinson and Muzaffar Alam in: A.L Dallapiccola / S. Zingel-Avé Lallemant (Eds.) 1993.
[9] See Zaman 2002.
[10] Set the contribution of Tariq Rahman in Malik, Jamal 2008.

teach the full course and most of them have modified the *Dars* according to their own emphasis. Although the *Dars* is compounded by rational and divine sciences, most of the content of rational sciences stems from very old publications. Therefore, many scholars complain of the *Dars* as being medieval, stagnant, and irrelevant to contemporary concerns. Moreover, the *Dars* is suspected of isolating the students from the modern world rather than engaging with it. However, this is not solely a result of the *Dars* itself. The particular form of teaching as well extra-curricular reading material shape the world view of *madrasa* students, too.

III. The political economy of madrasas

The post-colonial state made many efforts to modernise and homogenise *madrasa* education. Current examples of such reform attempts are the centralised "Model Dini Madaris Ordinance" (2002), the "Dini Madari Regulation and Control Ordinance" (2003) and the "Pakistan Madrasa Education Board" (2004). All these reforms have very limited impact. However, after independence the state managed to politicise the *Ulema* and, by doing so, infiltrated into formerly non-colonialised traditional parts of society. Its attempts to curb the *Ulema´s* power through its efforts to become the sole interpreter of religion in the public as well as the private sphere threatened the authority of the *Ulema* and further restricted their scope.[11] State strategies comprised co-optation as well as open repression. Both these strategies however, evoke reaction among the *Ulema* and the institutions they controlled. It should not come as a surprise that, due to their increasing economic and social pauperisation, they tend to become increasingly radical. The following radicalisation of large parts of the population was fuelled by the local popularity of religious institutions and their socio-economic networks such as mosques, schools, and hospitals which possess various channels for religious and political mobilisation of the masses, for example through the Friday prayer *(khutba)*. Frequently, some preachers use these gatherings to question the legitimacy of the state[12]. Therefore, the Friday prayer has become a very sensitive issue for the government, which has recently led to harsh restrictions on preachers both in mosques and *madrasas* in order to de-politicise the Friday gathering.The current increasing path of resistance is rather home-grown first and foremost, resulting from the encroachment of the post-colonial Pakistani state into arenas hitherto dominated by old established lineages and categories of social organisation such as families, tribes, religious endowments, charities and networks of learned tradition.[13] These non-state forms of social organisation stand apart from the "limited" ones offered by the state. Tensions between both patterns become virulent, if both contest each other. Since the state's influence and legitimacy remain limited and incomplete, it is not capable of becoming the prime source of authority and justice. This contributed to the ongoing financial and intellectual independence of religious education and its practitioners from the Pakistani state.

In addition, funds flowing from abroad and the local environment support this independence while at the same time embedding them ever more in the affairs of their local community. In this situation, local *Ulema* know about the needs of the people and succeed in responding much more efficiently than the anonymous state. The state in turn, contested from within, turns to even more authoritarian means of suppression and co-optation in order to gain control over the perceived threat of radicalised religiosity.

In the 1990s, the religious non-state contesters have dramatically radicalised to the extent that they have been accused of being responsible for terrorist assaults. In the face of mutual threat perceptions, a semantic of obscurantism was initiated and dramatised by state agents as well as their Islamist supporters. The concern of both groups was the reform and change of what is considered "uncivilised space" and the desire to "enlighten" and reform *(islah)* the masses with "true" Islam for the sake of the common good *(maslaha)*. Akin to the various 19th century reform movements, contemporary Islamists, in collaboration with state agencies, again seek to impose an urban global Islam on rural areas. Their aim is to replace local heteropraxy by universal orthopraxy, factual feudal oppressiveness and corruption by potential empowerment and a global set of ideas, prac-

[11] It should be mentioned that the crucial point of departure into resistance was – at least in Pakistan – just prior to the proclamation of the West Pakistan Waqf Property Ordinance 1961, which aimed at nationalizing waqf properties, thus interrogating the deeds given in the waqfiyyat.

[12] See Gaffney 1994. Increasingly, Islamists and traditionalists are converging. The reason is not only the common dissatisfaction with the representatives of the government. Paradoxically, state reform interventions in the traditional religious education system have led to an ideological rapprochement between Islamists and traditionalists. For Egypt, see for example Zeghal 1999; for Pakistan, see Malik 1998b.

[13] In fact, as far as the dissemination of knowledge is concerned it was primarily disseminated and reproduced – up to contemporary times – through family ties; see Salibi 1958; Brinner 1960; Bulliet 1972: 55-60; Mottahadeh 1980: 135ff.; Voll 1982; Robinson 1987.

tises and ethics. The target groups of local communities experience these civilising missions in an increasingly sectarian imagination. *Madrasas* in this context, often provide the loci for dissemination and proliferation of such ideas. Mostly they are led by laymen / Islamists / peripheral *Ulema* but are provided ideological nutrition by well-established *Ulema* themselves.[14] Support for these endeavours comes mostly from the commercial bourgeoisie and middle-classes. From the cities they increasingly infiltrate the countryside where they provoke regionalism, thereby endangering further the (post)-colonial state's attempts to reorder society in its own image. Finally, this leads to an expansion of the *Ulema´*s influence the extent to even come to dominate the Islamist discourse, leading to an Islamization from below. Thus, religious schools play an important role in interior politics.

Madrasas also gained great significance in an international context. They were caught up in power politics during and after the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan as well as in the ongoing fight for Kashmir. They were also used to influence the course of the Afghan civil war and the rise of the *Taliban*[15]. This led to the emergence of newer identities and several branches of *madrasa*s, exacerbating the state of sectarian fights. For analytical purposes one may distinguish between four types of groups, although a clear analytical taxonomy seems difficult since they definitely interact with each other and also overlap: first, there are the students of religious schools in general; second, the *muhajidin*[16]; third, the *Taliban*; and fourth the *jihadi* groups[17].

Historically, the first group has had a quietist role, although many students became radicalised through *jihadi* rhetoric and were used as foot soldiers in the Afghan civil war. This group of fighters organised themselves and therefore, formed the basis of the *mujahidin.* The third group of the *Taliban* can be described as an attempt to control the diverse and contesting ethnically organised groups. Within the fourth group, the *jihadi* groups, many members can be traced back to the *Taliban* or *mujahidin* themselves. Others are returnees from the battlefields in Kashmir, Afghanistan and Chechnya. Their leadership is composed of mostly well-educated men from the middle-class. However, *madrasa* students join these militant groups in the global rise of religious violence. This development is fuelled by the objective material conditions coupled with the symbolic power of regional conflicts such as Kashmir and Palestine that represent the suppression of whole nations. Though, these groups act on the global stage, their emergence often is a result of internal problems and frustrations caused by political and socio-economic mismanagement while simultaneously they have subsequently been exploited by external powers. The religious movements more and more use religious symbols - both homogenising and localising – to articulate the predicaments which people face in highly fragmented societies which have become increasingly subjected to unilaterally imposed pressures to adapt to modernisation through the Pakistani state. The growing presence and visibility of religious power in the public sphere represents this struggle between state and religious scholars and their institutions that had been exploited by different groups but at the same time been denied their share.

The empirical findings can be theorised with the help of the argument of political economy of globalisation and state-penetration: State-led globalisation and homogenisation leads to counter-globalisations, which at the same time take recourse to the imagined concept of the *umma* and also indigenises global Islamic knowledge. Globalisation processes from within and without occur simultaneously and, finally lead to new processes of self-authentification. On the one hand, the idea of universal Islam grows, accompanied by a movement that encourages uniform, global civilisation processes similar to the one proclaimed by the post-colonial state. On the other hand Muslim positions towards globalisation are heterogeneous. They may become co-actors, reactionary or simply affected

[14] There is obviously a long tradition of disputes, polemics and heresy. But this so-called refutation- or radd-literature did not traditionally focus on indoctrination with an intolerance of other religious systems. In Pakistan, however, the discriminating political and discursive strategies against the Ahmadiyya of the 1950s were frequently used as a template for later debates.

[15] The word Taliban is actually the Persian plural of the Arabic word talib, student, hence "students of (religious) schools". Most of them had been students in Pakistani madrasas, principally in NWFP and Baluchistan, where they founded a network of schools and ethnic affinities before they emerged at the end of 1994. The name Taliban was to make clear that they categorically rejected the party politics of the mujahidin. For more on Taliban, see Ahmad Rashid 2000.

[16] The mujahidin became warlords who in course of the war in Afghanistan had divided the country into fiefdoms. They fought in a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals and bloodshed, switching sides again and again. Ahmed Rashid supposes in Chapter I of his acclaimed book Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, that "US funds were matched by Saudi Arabia and together with support from other European and Islamic countries the mujahidin received a total of over US$10 billion. Most of this aid was in the form of lethal modern weaponry given to a simple agricultural people who used it with devastating results."

[17] It is banal to point out that an ordinary madrasa student can join the mujahidin, who themselves, like the Taliban, could have joined *jihadi* groups.

forces, as in the case of the Islamic scholars. Meanwhile many instances of reciprocity exist which transform post-colonial processes into complex encounters of local and global factors. Therefore, Islamic scholars and their institutions "share external [global] pressures, but represent distinct domestic [local] struggles".[18]

To sum up, one can clearly observe far-reaching changes in the religious landscape that derive from changes in the distribution of global (or state) resources and in the power structures thereof. The forces of globalisation, combined with the penetration of the modern state, search relentlessly for ways to standardise and homogenise their social, economic and political environment. This, in turn, produces a reaction of the challenged local forces that resist in radical as well as eclectic forms of religious expression. Eventually, *madrasas* have become more and more important as disgruntled young Muslims turn towards religion as an expression of protest against the socio-economic injustice and political marginalisation affected by the "modern" era.

IV. The ideational resistance

The above analysis of religious "resistance" processes may also be explained on the basis of ideas. Indeed, there seems to be enough evidence that the recent expressions of religious "resistance" in the context of local *madrasas* are a response to local struggles between local factions competing for scare resources "from below". The argument emphasizes that the protest is directed against the homogenising language of secular modernity and homogeneous notions of Islam that threaten to eradicate local religious and sectarian alternatives. Therefore, it is not only a struggle for economic and political control but divergent approaches within the specific terms of Islam itself. In Pakistan various sectarian identities compete for recognition and influence while altogether they feel threatened by streamlining forces of modernity. Hence, one can distinguish two quite different forms of religious resistance, both of which take shape in the context of the modern *madrasa*. The first form of resistance opposes homogenisation processes of modernity by (similarly) homogenising notions of Islam. Good examples for this form of ideational resistance are the *Barelwis* who insist that "the only true Muslim is an *Ahl-i Sunnat / Barelwi Muslim*", or the *Jama´at-i Islami*, which propagates a universal, de-cultured and de-territorialised Islamic identity. The second form of religious resistance is directed against the homogenisation of secular modernity as well as homogenising notions of Islam. Instead, an approach that highlights pluralism and diversity even within the specific terms of Islam is used. This pluralist form of resistance could possibly help to overcome this enduring struggle for religious identity. Unfortunately this approach seems to remain a desirable but distant option since religious homogenisation within and beyond the different sects is currently predominant. This development reminds of the first form of religious, anti-pluralist, singularising resistance to "modern" colonial and post-colonial homogenising efforts by the state.

Often, the attempts to homogenise Islam within one sect or group lead to very sharp lines of social diversion. In this process identities of "us" and "them" are created. The Islam of other groups may be denounced as "false" and therefore, perceived as a threat to the "true" Islam of the own group.[19] The exclusion of other sub-sects from Islam and the denunciation of their members are closely connected to the rise of inter-sectarian violence. To the extent that *madrasas* promote their own exclusive religious perspective and genealogy they seem to engage in violent conflict with rival Muslim groups. Religious violence, then, targets other Muslim sects rather than non-Muslims. This sectarianism is an internal problem of Pakistan, which is not linked to international terrorism. Although Pakistani *madrasas* are contributing to sectarian violence they should not be perceived as trainings camps of *al-Qaeda* in general.[20] A more careful conclusion must be drawn. Indeed, one can understand this expression of religious resistance in the terms of ideas and local identities, as a response to local struggles between different groups competing for scare resources "from below".

V. Conclusion

The analysis has shown that *madrasas* and Islamic learning traditions today are the em-

[18] Schäbler / Sternberg 2004: XX.
[19] For a detailed discussion on the process of identity formation see Arshad Alam´s analysis on Ahl-i Sunnat in Northindia; in Malik, Jamal 2008: Madrasas in South Asia: Teaching terror?, Routledge 2008.
[20] See Saleem H. Ali´s contribution in the same volume.

bodiment of a variety of resistance patterns. On the one hand one can observe religious resistance to secular modernity as stipulated by state-led homogenisation and globalisation efforts. The state actions from above challenge various responses opposed to the secularising and mainstreaming trend.

The state faces resistance or even counter-globalisations from *madrasas* that aim to enhance political and economic influence. On the other hand, *madrasas* are exposed to the challenges of homogenisation and globalisation notions of Islam within the religious discourses. Two forms of resistance can be distinguished: first, homogenising processes of the secular modernity are answered with homogenising notions of Islam. This form of resistance is predominant today. Second, a kind of pluralist reaction to secular homogenising processes seems possible that highlights the diversity and heterogeneity of religious discourses within this domain. Although, the pluralist approach is empirically marginal yet, it definitely has the potential to bridge between different perceptions of Islam. However, modern *madrasas* are more and more confronted with a rise of sectarian aggression and religious violence that target and contest the Muslim-others rather than non-Muslims. The variety and variation of *madrasas* transgress the boundaries between resistance and homogenisation, terror and Islamic normativity, between radicalisation and Islamic learning. Moreover, they provide for a variety of cultural articulations and institutions that are important to old and new identities.

New processes of self-authentification in the context of modern *madrasas* are based on a systemic combination of continuity and change, of transformation and permanence. As such, *madrasas* care for specific local needs as well as for collective interests of major parts of society. Hence, *madrasas* and their political leadership can play an important role in the adaption of globalising and modernising developments to specific needs of their local community in the sense of "glocalisation"[21]. In doing so, *madrasas* do have the potential to enhance the national and cultural integration of their local environments into broader contexts in a way the post-colonial state would hardly be able to offer with its authoritative means alone. "Teaching terror" and religious violence can be endowed with different meanings if seen in their specific contexts, whether as Islamic resistance to secular modernity and its homogenisations or as localised challenges to both Islamic and modern secular globalisation.

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[21] On glocalization see Robertson 1995.